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Deeper integration: What effects on trade? 
Abstract 
The focus of this paper is to estimate the effect of the different types of regional trade 
agreements on the volume of trade between country pairs. The analysis will employ the 
“empirical workhorse” of international trade; the gravity model. We hypothesize that the 
deeper agreements have a stronger effect on trade, especially when considering the extensive 
margin of trade. When controlling for the extensive margin of trade, the multilateral trade 
resistance terms, and the endogeneity bias we are able to obtain satisfyingly accurate 
treatment effects of the different types of regional trade agreements. Using a panel of 50 
countries over the period 1980-1999, we find that customs unions, “deep” free trade 
agreements, and common markets have stronger effects on bilateral trade than simple free 
trade agreements. 
Key Words: F1 
JEL Codes: Regional trade agreements, Deep integration, International trade flows, Gravity 
equation, Panel data 
1. Introduction 
The focus of this paper is the effect of the different types of free trade agreements on the 
volume of trade between country pairs. National governments have been increasingly 
choosing to pursue open-trade policies and have been supported in this by the international 
community. The importance in the international economic agenda is undoubted, but the 
question remains on how to achieve free trade? There exist two major schools of thought in 
trade liberalization, which are multilateralism and regionalism. The approach that aims at 
achieving  global free trade is multilateralism. Despite this noble intention it has proven 
difficult to implement. The Doha round, which is the current round of negotiations dealing 
with lowering barriers to trade on an international level, was temporarily suspended (in 2003), 
and its future remains uncertain. There exists a second (sometimes referred to as the second-3 
 
best) option, regionalism. In the regional approach trade is liberalized only between a select 
group of countries, rather than a multilateral decrease in barriers to all countries in the world. 
We have seen the emergence of European based bloc (the EU) and a North American bloc 
(NAFTA), which through their large size have strong bargaining power. The focus of freeing 
up trade between only a select group of countries, rather than on a global scale has other 
merits however. The notion of free trade has been in some ways reduced to international 
policy measures like tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Some authors have been stressing the 
importance of behind-the-border regulations that hinder international trade
2. This issue has 
been taken up on a global level; it has received mention by the World Bank and the WTO
3, 
and it is precisely here where regionalism has an advantage over multilateralism. It enables 
the deeper integration of economies worldwide
4. There seems to be a trade-off between the 
number of countries involved in trade liberalization and the depth achieved. 
In this paper we employ the “empirical workhorse” of international trade; the gravity model. 
The gravity model has often been applied to studying the effects of reduced trade costs and 
trade liberalization. The study of economic integration using the gravity equation has focused 
on WTO membership, Free Trade Agreements in general
5, currency unions
6, or individual 
agreements, such as the European Union or NAFTA
7. In this paper the preferential trade 
agreements will be grouped into four different kinds, modifying the classifications of the 
World Trade Organization. The agreements that will be covered are the European Union (EU-
15), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the European Economic Area (EEA), the 
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the Asian Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Common Economic Relations 
Agreement (CER) between Australia and New Zealand, as well as various agreements signed 
                                                            
2 For example, Lawrence (1996). 
3 „Behind-the border” and Regulatory Issues, World Bank. 
4 Lawrence (1996). 
5 For example Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Magee (2003). 
6 Rose (2000). 
7 Martínez-Zarzoso et al (2009). 4 
 
between individual countries or by individual countries with regional blocs in the period 1980 
to 1999. A full list is given in the appendix. The different types of agreements as stated by the 
WTO are Customs Unions (CU), Free Trade Agreements (FTA), Economic Integration 
Agreements (EIA), and Partial Scope Agreements (PS). As a whole they will be referred to as 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs).
8  
This paper will therefore have a clear focus on the regional approach to free trade. The 
motivation is to examine the different trade policy options nations have when choosing to 
enter a preferential trade agreement. We hypothesize that the deeper agreements have a 
stronger effect on trade, especially when considering the extensive margin (the number of 
products traded). 
The main novelty of this research is the use of recent developments in the theory of 
international trade and in the econometric analysis of gravity models to control for three 
common biases present in previous estimates of the effects of FTAs on bilateral trade flows. 
Those biases are related to the extensive margin of trade (Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 
2008), the multilateral trade resistance terms (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), and 
endogeneity bias (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).  
Using a panel of cross-section time-series data from 1980 to 1999 for 50 countries, our 
empirical results suggest three important conclusions. First, deeper agreement cause more 
trade than the more shallow agreements. Second, the fears of PTAs causing trade diversion 
effects are not confirmed. Third, our findings indicate that the endogeneity bias and the 
“extensive margin” omitted variable bias are strongest for the deeper agreements, especially 
the common market.  
Section 2 will review some of the relevant literature. Section 3 will introduce the theoretical 
Gravity Model of Trade, followed by the empirical model specifications and a discussion of 
the data in Section 4. The results will be presented in Section 5. The last section concludes. 
                                                            
8 Bhagwati (2008). 5 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on the gravity model is extensive to say the least. The focus here will be on a 
handful of papers that are relevant to the study of preferential trade agreements and their 
effect on trade flows. They are part of what could be called a revival of the gravity model, 
which has improved its theoretical specification. 
The results found by estimations of the ex-post effect of preferential trade agreements on 
trade flows have varied and seem to rely heavily on the specification on the model. The 
intuitive effect of a trade agreement is an increase in trade flows, since it aims to reduce trade 
barriers which are negatively related to trade flows. Yet the size of this effect, has sometimes 
been found to be very small (as little as a 5% increases in trade flows)
9, or even statistically 
insignificant effects up to doubling trade within 10 years
10. 
This section will focus on three recent papers (and relevant follow-ups) that directly concern 
the study undertaken here. These are: Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) (from now on 
referred to as AvW2003), Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) (HMR2008) and Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007) (BB2007). 
The major improvement in the specification of the gravity model has been the introduction of 
multilateral trade resistance terms. Representing resistance to trade with all trading partners, 
they put bilateral trade resistance (and our PTA dummies) into a new perspective. We follow 
the specifications of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and the extension to panel data by 
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). They helped to solve the so-called Border Puzzle, forwarded by 
McCallum (1995), which was a strong overestimation of bilateral trade resistance. The study 
of PTA’s is strongly susceptible to endogeneity bias of the variable of interest and bilateral 
trade flows. This has been well-documented in the literature (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; 
                                                            
9 Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). 
10 Baier and Bergstrand (2007). 6 
 
Magee, 2003; Trefler, 1993). Whereas earlier work drew on instrumental variable techniques 
to solve this problem, we now have panel data at hand.  
Baier and Bergstrand (2004), claim to be the first authors to estimate the probability of two 
countries signing a PTA. They find that factors that contribute to welfare gains by a PTA 
increase the likelihood of countries signing a PTA. Incidentally these are similar to those 
factor that determine trade flows, such as geographic distance, remoteness of the pair to the 
rest of the world, larger and more similar GDPs of the two countries, differences in the 
capital/labor ratios of the countries, and the difference in these ratios relative to the rest of the 
world.
11 Using this set of variables they correctly predict just shy of 90% of PTAs in place at 
the time. In general, they claim, countries have “chosen well” when entering PTAs. 
Additional to these economic determinants, there also exists a political economy of PTA 
determination, which is summarized by Magee (2003). He finds that economies are more 
likely to select into PTAs if they are both democracies and are on the same side of the world 
median of the capital/labor ratio and also if they are natural trading partners.  
These findings raise doubts on the causality of preferential trade agreements. Do PTAs cause 
trade, or does trade cause PTAs. The intuition is simple, countries which trade a lot with each 
other are intuitively more inclined to lower barriers to trade, so that they can take advantage 
of cheaper imports and reap welfare gains.  
BB2007 also point out that this endogeneity could be due to domestic regulations in the 
countries. They argue that restrictive domestic regulations can also affect the decision to enter 
a PTA since this is an opportunity to harmonize them and so make them less restrictive.   
Whereas Magee (2003) is limited to using instrumental variable techniques to address the 
issues of endogeneity since his data is cross-sectional, panel data has some distinct advantages 
in dealing with this reverse causality. By assuming that the underlying reasons for countries 
being “natural” trading partners (for example contiguity, common language and a low 
                                                            
11 Page 30 BB2004. 7 
 
geographic greater circle distance between them) are time-constant in nature, using fixed 
effect regressions can wipe out this endogeneity. This is preferred to instrumental variable 
techniques since they rely heavily on the instruments used. BB2007 therefore argue that the 
determinants of PTAs are most likely to be cross-sectional in nature, and good instruments are 
often, and also in the case here, hard to come by. Domestic regulations on the other hand are 
not always time-constant. Thinking back to AvW2003 and the multilateral trade resistance, it 
is plausible to think that domestic regulations can be an unobserved component of the MTRs. 
High levels of regulation, such as stiff competition laws, high product standards, rigid labor 
markets, restrictive internal shipping regulations and the like will affect trade with all 
countries. Hence controlling for the MTRs will also control for this “new” endogeneity issue 
raised by BB2007. There could also be an unobserved component that is pair-specific time-
variant, such as the difference in domestic regulations between two countries. Since wiping 
out this heterogeneity would also wipe out the PTA dummy, we unfortunately cannot control 
for this. 
All authors that have addressed the issue of endogeneity in the study of PTAs or NTBs have 
found that the effect eliminating or at least reducing the endogeneity pushes coefficients 
upwards. The endogeneity bias is therefore downward. In this study there is a differentiation 
between the types of trade agreements according to depth. We therefore surmise that the 
estimated effects of deeper agreements are more likely to be affected by endogeneity bias, for 
all of the reasons above. The stronger trade-relations are between countries the higher are the 
gains by deeper integration.  
Finally, HMR2008 proposed a new method for incorporating the so-called extensive margin 
of trade into the gravity model. This method is based on a dynamic industry model forwarded 
by Melitz (2003) which allowed for firm-level heterogeneity in a trade model based on 
monopolistic competition by the likes of Krugman (1980). Melitz devised a model which 
could explain the entry and exit of firms in the domestic and exporting sector, with explicit 8 
 
modeling of firm productivity. In order to profitably export, firms have to be able to cover the 
fixed costs of trade with their revenues. Later, HMR2008 showed that the factors entry and 
exit in and out of the exporting sector has an effect on the volume of trade between countries. 
This was done with a two-step empirical model that can exploit differences in firm-level 
productivity without actually needing firm-level data. This has some important implications 
for the estimation of a gravity model. First of all it allows for the presence of zero trade flows 
between countries. This had previously found consideration by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). 
Zero trade flows between countries can occur quite often, especially between developing 
countries. The same factors that explain positive trade flows should be able to explain zero 
trade flows also; not considering them will therefore leave out a considerable amount of 
information when empirically estimating a gravity model, and make the results also 
susceptible to sample selection bias. Some unobserved heterogeneity not covered by the 
extensive margin may remain and determine selection into positive trade flows.  With the 
explicit introduction of firm-productivity and fixed costs of trade, it is possible that countries 
do not trade, because no firm can profitably export to foreign markets given the country 
characteristics and costs of trade. Other work on the exporting sector, by Roberts and Tybout 
(1995) for example, find that firms face considerably large sunk (or fixed) costs of trade. In 
previous estimations of the gravity models, such as in AvW2003, the costs of trade all enter 
into the price, and are so passed on to the importer. However, as in production some costs are 
necessarily sunk to enter a market. The export market is no different.  
When estimating variables related to trade barriers there is omitted variable bias if the 
extensive margin is not controlled for. HMR2008 show that preferential trade agreements 
have a statistically significant effect on the extensive margin as well as on the volume of trade 
between countries. In a follow-up paper by Martinez-Zarzoso et al (2009) the effect of the EU 
is increased compared to the same specification without the extensive margin. 9 
 
One must note that HMR2008 use a cross-section of countries, here we will apply the same 
method to our panel data set.  
When controlling for the extensive margin of trade, the multilateral trade resistance terms, and 
the endogeneity bias we expect to find satisfyingly accurate estimates treatment effects of the 
different types of PTAs. As mentioned above the problem of endogeneity is expected to be 
larger for the deeper trade agreements. Similarly, the bias due to omission of the extensive 
margin is assumed to be larger for the deeper agreements, since the deeper agreements are 
expected to have a larger effect on the fixed costs of trade such as legal and regulatory or 
language costs.   
When studying the trade effects of PTAs it is essential to refer to what Viner (1950) called the 
trade creation and trade diversion effects. Carrère (2006) proposes a set of dummies to capture 
these trade creation and diversion effects, these will be introduced in Section 4. 
3. The Gravity Model of Trade 
The gravity model of trade is the most relied on model to study the pattern of international 
trade flows. It has a long history dating back to the 1950’s and 1960’s when it was used by 
Tinbergen (1962) to study the trade effects of the European Community. It lends its name 
from Newtonian gravity theory, because of its similar form, which can be rewritten for trade 
in a very simplified way as: 
      
    
   
                                      (1) 
On the left hand side of the equation is the trade flow between two economies   and  .     and 
    stand for the size of the economies (GDP) and     is the distance between the two. The 
larger the distance the lower the bilateral trade-flow, and the larger the economies, the larger 
the trade flows, depending on a factor of proportionality  . If one thinks of the two economies 
as masses the analogy to the physical gravity theory is obvious.   is a gravitational 10 
 
(un)constant which can stand for any sort of trade resistance factors.There will be trade from   
to   and vice-versa.  
The major advantage of the gravity model has proven to be its strong fit to the data, even in its 
early applications where a theoretical justification was still lacking. Its explanatory power for 
international trade flows is high; R-squares of around 70% are common. Further, it can be 
applied when assuming different underlying theories of trade and because of this it should not 
be used to determine which theory works best.
12 Since Anderson (1979) there has been an 
increasingly better theoretical foundation of the gravity model. Since then almost all work 
using the gravity model has included price terms that incorporate equilibrium conditions of 
the trading countries.  
First let us turn to monopolistic competition that is underlying theory for the gravity model as 
applied here. The “new trade theory” as formed by Krugman 1980, is based on the 
monopolistic competition models of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Krugman showed that under 
monopolistic competition there can be welfare gains by trade due to economies of scale, and a 
love of variety by consumers. Through trade firms can take advantage of bigger markets and 
drive down their average costs, whereas consumers have a larger spectrum of goods to choose 
from.   
At the heart of the gravity model is the consumer utility function. The Dixit-Stiglitz consumer 
utility function shows a love of variety with a constant elasticity of substitution between 
goods.  
           
 
         
 
  0       1       ( 2 )  
Consumers in country    derive a utility   by consuming goods      from a continuum of 
goods  . Note that the number of goods available for consumption will be lower than the 
number of potential products. The theory only deals with the amount of goods that are 
                                                            
12 Deardorff (1998). 11 
 
actually produced.   is a parameter for the degree of substitution. For ease of notation, 
   
 
      will be the elasticity of substitution, which is assumed constant. This means all 
firms are facing the same residual demand function.  
The quantity demanded for any given good   depends not only on the price, but also on the 
ratio of the price to the overall price-level, i.e. the relative price. This can be written as: 
       
         
  
                                                                         (3) 
The price level    
    can be expressed as 
                  
 
   
 
                                                               (4) 
It is so determined by the prices of all goods consumed in a country. Some of the products are 
produced in the home country whereas others are imported, implying that   could be equal to . 
Since each country has a different set of firms, and each firm produces a distinct variety there 
are ∑    
 
     firms or varieties. The share of the importing countries income spent on goods 
from the exporter so depends on the price of the imported good relative to the price level 
present in importing country. 
Looking at the production side we can now form the price of the product as it leaves the 
producer. It is assumed that firms use only one factor of production, labor
13. The costs of 
labor are country specific and are so the same for all companies. Due to monopolistic 
competition each producer can sell his distinct product with a mark-up. This depends on the 
elasticity of substitution,  . The mark-up is smaller the larger is the demand elasticity. A high 
demand-elasticity means consumers will react more to changes in prices which will force 
firms to charge a lower mark-up. The mark-up is often assumed to be one for ease of notation.  
The price charged when a good leaves the producer is therefore given by         
  
  .  
                                                            
13 As in Krugman 1980. 12 
 
When a good is traded, the trade costs must be added. The so-called landed price of the good, 
as it reaches the consumer in the destination market is            
  
   .
14 Trade costs therefore 
follow the melting iceberg specification in that     goods must be exported in order for one to 
arrive. For example internal trade (no trade costs) would show            1 . 
The gravity model is basically an expenditure function, in which the expenditure of a foreign 
country (as a share of its total expenditure) on the goods of the domestic country are matched 
with the prices and quantities offered. This is given by the market clearing condition, where 
      ∑           is the income of  , which must equal the revenues of all produced goods, given 
that   can be equal to  ; only a fraction thereof is sold overseas. This fraction is determined by 
the share of expenditure of the importer as in the above demand function. 
Multiplying by the amount of firms or varieties     allows us to drop the summation sign and 
we get aggregate bilateral trade which will be given by    .  
     
    
  
 
   
  
 
   
   
∑  
   
  
 
   
     
 
   
                                                  (5) 
This is the gravity model as it will be estimated.     is equal to unity if there is trade between 
the two countries and zero if not, following Helpman et al (2008). It is determined by a firm 
profit function à la Melitz 2003, and is shown below. This equation is the same as in 
HMR2008. It is a more flexible version than the one presented in AvW2003, and is therefore 
preferred.  HMR2008 show how the above is also valid under the symmetry assumption of 
bilateral trade barriers to be the same as the simplified gravity model presented in AvW2003. 
3.1 Multilateral Trade Resistance 
MTRs capture the resistance of a country to trade with all countries. Some countries are more 
likely to trade than others given their economic conditions, and apart from geographic aspects. 
MTRs can be expressed as the country’s price level: 
                                                            
14 In AvW2003 the mark-up is set as one, which is plausible since under monopolistic in the long-run 
profits=average costs due to free entry and exit. 13 
 
     
   
  ∑       
   
  
 
   
, where     
  
   
                                     (6) 
and, 
          ∑       
   
  
 
   
, where     
  
   
                                     (7) 
Trade between all countries is therefore subject to these equilibrium conditions. According to 
AvW2003, given their gravity model trade can be decomposed into three components. The 
bilateral resistance between country   and  , which are the trade costs      and the resistance of 
  to trade with all countries, and the resistance of country   to all countries. This can be 
written as, 
            
   
                                                             (8) 
This is somewhat limited since it implies that zero trade flows would be due to one of these 
trade barriers being infinite. This can hardly be the case. In order to define     , which can 
explain the existence of zero trade flows we will now turn to define the extensive margin of 
trade. 
3.2 The extensive margin of trade 
HMR2008 and Melitz (2003) add an additional parameter which varies over firms. The price 
of good  , as it leaves production in their specification is given by       
   
  , where   is the 
number of input bundles used in order to produce one unit. This number of input bundles 
determines the productivity of firms, which can be written as 1     . The productivity is firm 
specific and relative to the other firms present in that country; it assumed to be known by the 
firm.
15 Following a relevant literature the distribution of firm productivity in industries is 
given by a pareto distribution truncated at zero. This represented here by the cumulative 
distribution function      subject to the lower and upper bounds,    ,    . This distribution is 
assumed to be the same in all countries. Note that productivity is time-constant, since they 
                                                            
15 Since we are only dealing with the selection into export markets, not selection into production from scratch, 
firms are already in production and so have gained knowledge of their productivity. 14 
 
draw from the distribution only once, when they started production, and they then make their 
decision to export.
16  
We can so define firm profits as  
          1    
      
   
 
   
                                              (9) 
Note that fixed costs of trade        enter explicitly.  Firm specific profits and revenues 
compared to other firms depend only on the firm’s productivity
17.   
The term  1    
      
   
 
   
    gives revenues
18. When a good is sold in the domestic market 
these fixed costs equal zero,       0 . This means all firms eligible to export are selling in the 
home market, since they will all be able to earn positive profits. Firms with higher 
productivity can produce the same product at a lower cost, or a product of higher quality at 
equal costs compared to other firms. More productive firms will therefore be more likely to 
cover the fixed costs that are necessarily sunk to break into a foreign market. This is in line 
with the empirical findings of Pavcnic  (2001). Rearranging (9) and setting it equal to  zero, 
 1    
        
   
 
   
                                                      (10) 
shows that there exists a cut-off productivity 
 
   
 at which a firm exactly breaks-even by 
exporting. All firms with a productivity higher than 
 
   
 will profitably serve the foreign 
markets; they will be able to cover the fixed trade costs with their revenues and earn positive 
profits. The cut-off productivity is determined by the country characteristics of the importer 
and exporter and bilateral trade costs as well as income of the importer.  
This also means that there will only be trade when          , meaning that the cut-off 
productivity is included in the range of productivities. It could be that some of the trade costs 
are so prohibitive and the cost characteristics of the exporter are so high, that the cut-off 
                                                            
16 Melitz (2003). 
17 Melitz (2003). 
18 It is equivalent to  , where     is the expenditure of the importing country. 15 
 
productivity is well out of range. Given the below choice diagram this can explain the 
existence of zero trade flows. 
                  ,if          
   
  
0    otherwise
                                       (11) 
Notably different to previous specifications of the gravity model we see here an introduction 
of the fixed costs of trade, and that these are important in determining the profitability of 
companies entering the exporting sector. In AvW2003 all trade costs, be they fixed or 
variable, enter into the price, and so are passed on from the exporter to the importer who pays 
for the good. In HMR2008, only variable trade costs enter into the price term. As we saw in 
the section on trade costs and in the literature, fixed costs of trade can be high. Especially 
when taking notice of domestic barriers to trade. This model is therefore the preferred choice.  
Having introduced the theoretical basis of this study we will now turn to the empirical 
specifications that will provide us with some results on the role of preferential trade 
agreements in determining trade. 
4. Model specification and empirical estimation 
  The above theory leaves us with the following gravity equation, presented here in its 
multiplicative form: 
             
      
        
        
        
      
                                (12) 
     and      are the incomes of the importing and exporting countries respectively. A higher 
GDP of the exporter is likely to increase trade, since the level of production is higher, and 
there are so more goods available for exporting. The GDP of the importing country is also 
likely to have a positive effect on trade flows, since the importing country has more buying 
power and so the demand level is higher. The traditional estimates of      and      on the flow 
of goods is somewhere close to unity. The       and        terms capture the effect of the 
populations size of the exporting and importing countries. Population size can affect the 16 
 
capital/labor ratio of countries, which can determine trade flows. Countries with large 
populations tend to have a low capital to labor ratios, which can determine the structure of 
trade and can either have a positive or negative effect. Large countries are likely to engage 
more in internal trade, and are not so dependent on international trade as for example small 
countries.      is a variable related to any other trade frictions. 
Correct modeling of trade costs is essential for proper estimation of the effects of reducing 
trade barriers, such as PTAs, since otherwise these trade costs will enter into the error term 
making      ,     0 , causing a bias in the estimated coefficients. Here only the log of 
distance is included since it often used to proxy for all variable trade costs, when the melting 
iceberg specification is used. All other trade costs factors enter into     , for now. 
Standard in gravity model work is also the inclusion of a common language dummy (equal to 
1 if both countries share the same official language), a colony dummy (equal to one if they 
were ever in a colonial relationship), and a contiguity or adjacency dummy (equal to one if 
two countries share a common national border). They aim to capture language, cultural and 
geographic trade costs respectively. Sometimes a landlocked variable is included, which is 
one if goods must cross at least one national border before they can reach a port of sea. An 
island dummy can also be included which is equal to unity if a country is an island state, or 
religion dummies that indicate whether two countries share the same religion and also capture 
cultural effects on trade. Most of these variables are time-invariant in nature, and as the 
preferred model eliminates all time fixed heterogeneity this makes them inestimable. This 
study does not set out to estimate the effects of being an island state, or a landlocked country 
on trade flows, and so we will only maintain the four aforementioned standard gravity model 
dummies. 17 
 
4.1 Regional Trade Agreements and their economic effects 
Central to this paper is the differentiation between the types of regional trade agreements. 
There are four general types of agreements that are available to policy makers as defined by 
the WTO: Partial Scope, Free Trade Agreement (FTA), Economic Integration Agreement 
(EIA) and Customs Union. A partial scope agreement involves a reduction in tariffs and non-
tariff barriers that only covers a limited range of goods. It is not expected to have a very large 
effect on aggregate trade flows, and will not be considered further here. An example is the 
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA). 
A FTA is the most straightforward regional trade arrangement. It is often signed by only two 
countries and only covers trade in goods. It is defined in the GATT under Article 8 i) which 
states that “duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (…) are eliminated with 
respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of or free trade area 
or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such 
territories.” This means all tariff and non-tariff barriers are removed between the contracting 
parties. Substantial product coverage usually refers to about 80% - 90%, where some sensitive 
industries can be left out. FTAs are easier to negotiate than an EIA or CU (explained below). 
Often countries enter into FTAs because of complementary good availability, like for example 
raw materials and high tech goods. This way one country can secure raw materials that it 
might not have itself whilst the other can import technology it cannot locally produce. An EIA 
relates to trade in services and is often signed together with an agreement covering trade in 
goods, or builds on such an agreement that is already in place. An EIA includes directives on 
the movement of people, financial services, and telecommunications
19.  
“…economic integration agreements (EIAs) may be defined as agreements that facilitate 






We hypothesize that these can also affect costs of trade in goods, by facilitating knowledge of 
foreign markets and business practices across national borders. By being closer to the 
destination market it will be easier (and cheaper) to adapt products to that market, learn about 
new regulations, take advantage of local knowledge and increase security of investments. 
Production could still be occurring at home, and only some internal services would be 
relocated abroad. Especially the free movement of capital will facilitate relations. It enables 
foreign direct investment, which allows the establishment of foreign offices, and supplier 
industries to name a few. Companies can also invest in their own distribution networks, and 
easily outsource other supplier services. In this way, an EIA is expected to address trade costs 
that arise from behind-the-border regulations, more than an agreement only covering trade in 
goods. Finally, a customs union is defined under GATT Article 8 in the same way as a free 
trade area, differing only in the respect that includes the creation of common external tariff. 
Article 8 ii): “…substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied 
by each of the members of the union to the trade of territories not included in the union;”  
In this way it has a stronger regional emphasis in that trade policies toward third countries 
must be aligned with the other nations. This requires the creation of supra-national institutions 
to coordinate such policies. Fears exist that if countries maintain their individual trade policies 
to third countries goods will be exported to one-member country with lower external tariffs 
and from there be sent over the “free” border to the intended destination market of another 
member, thereby saving on duties. This is dealt with in rules of origins directives, which are 
sometimes difficult to implement, or by a common external tariff. Apart from that, within the 
union, there is a focus on the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers.  
Having introduced the different types of trade agreements that are notified to the WTO, it 
should be noted that in reality there may be combinations, especially of agreements covering 
trade in goods and agreements covering trade in services. NAFTA is an example of this. It is a 
FTA under GATT Art XXIV combined with an EIA according to GATS Art. V. This 19 
 
constitutes a much stronger integration between the contracting parties that simply an 
agreement in the trade in goods. Whilst keeping sovereignty over trade policy towards non-
members this constitutes the creation of common internal market. This will be referred to as a 
deep FTA. When there is free movement of goods, persons, capital and services and  a 
common external tariff one can speak of a common market. Deep FTAs and Common 
Markets entail the so-called four freedoms; the free movement of goods, capital, persons and 
services. 
Finally there are also economic and monetary unions. Currently the EU is such an agreement, 
but since the data only spans until 1999, this will not receive any treatment. For a study of the 
effect of currency unions we refer to Rose (2000). 
The terms Free Trade Agreement, or Economic Integration Agreement are used extensively in 
the literature, and at times their meanings are ambiguous. Some studies which address FTAs, 
have however included all types of preferential trade agreements. The definitions given in this 
section will apply throughout; they are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Classification of Regional Integration Agreements  
The specific agreements and their members and also what type of agreements they are, are 
listed in Appendix B. 
In our empirical model, the        variable represents a set of dummies set to unity when 
both the importer and exporter are in some sort of preferential trade agreement.  
         ∑      ,      ,        ,       ),                                   (13) 
according to the classification in Table 1. Partial scope agreements have been left out, since 
they do not apply to aggregate trade. Some preliminary results had shown highly insignificant 
coefficients, which was expected. 
Apart from capturing the intra-bloc trade effects, the study of the preferential trade 
agreements ever since Viner’s work in 1950 should include trade creation and trade diversion 
effects caused by regional trading blocs. As proposed by Carrére 2006, and amongst others 20 
 
before her by Limao and Venables 2001 the Vinerian effects of trade creation and trade 
diversion can be quite easily captured by a set of dummies.  
The lowering of trade costs (and therefore prices of imported goods) between selected groups 
of countries are likely to change the structure of trade in the global trading system. The 
analysis here will refer to trade between two countries in the agreement, and a third non-
member country, which is akin to the rest of the world.  
The set of dummies that can capture trade creation and trade diversion effects is composed of 
three separate sets. 
ln      Ψ     ∑             ∑             ∑                           (14) 
Where Ψ   is a vector of all other RHS variables used in the gravity, but omitted here for 
simplicity.       is set to unity if the trading partners   and   are in the same trading bloc and 
is otherwise 0. The dummy       is set to 1 if the importer    is in a trading bloc but the 
trading partner   is not and is otherwise 0. The variable       is 1 if   is in a trading bloc but 
its trading partner   not and is otherwise zero. The dummies refer to intra bloc trade 
∑           , importer effects ∑            and exporter effects ∑           . The subscripts: 
 ,  and   stand for intra-bloc, imports and exports. The signs of these coefficients can give 
insight on the trade creation and diversion effects of PTA’s.  
If the coefficient on intra bloc trade is positive, this means there is more trade within the bloc 
compared to the reference. This can either be due to domestically produced goods for any 
given member country, or at the expense of imports from 3
rd countries, given the same level 
of consumption. If there are positive intra-bloc trade effects and positive extra-bloc import 
effects this means there is trade creation of imports.  However, if     0 and     0  there is 
trade creation and diversion. Trade creation and trade diversion can be a contraction of 
imports from outside the region and an expansion of exports, or vice versa. The welfare gains 
will be determined by this. If the increase in    is larger than the decrease in   , the higher 21 
 
level of trade within the bloc was at the expense of imports from the RoW. If the decrease in 
extra bloc imports offsets the increase in intra bloc trade              one can speak of pure 
trade diversion of imports. If     0 and     0  there is trade creation of exports. If however 
    0  then there is trade creation together with export diversion, so long as the negative 
export to RoW effect is smaller than the positive intra-bloc effect. It is likely that exports from 
a given country inside the bloc are now sold within the bloc and not to 3
rd countries. This is a 
welfare loss for non-members. If this is not the case then there is only export diversion. This 
latter case would be a decrease in welfare for the non-member countries. Their imports from 
countries now within the bloc have decreased. The        dummy will in the following refer 
to this entire set of dummies, including the exporter and import dummies. 
4.2 A short note on unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error bias 
More difficult to model are the mentioned regulatory barriers, tariffs, and NTBs. Apart from 
tariff data they are largely unobserved; even tariffs are difficult to measure. More importantly 
they are correlated with the PTA dummies. In using panel data we have more opportunity to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
In the literature review we have identified three different types of heterogeneity that may 
cause biased estimates. These are time-constant heterogeneity   , country and time 
heterogeneity     
   and    
  , time-variant pair specific heterogeneity      and time-variant 
heterogeneity that affects all countries and pairs   . Anything time-constant that is specific to 
the individuals (here trading pairs) will difference out of the equation when using fixed 
effects. The country and time heterogeneity, which includes the MTRs and domestic 
regulations, will remain, but can be controlled for by the set of interaction dummies proposed 
by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). The time-variant heterogeneity can be controlled for with 
time dummies. This leaves pair specific time-varying heterogeneity remaining. Some of 
which could be unobserved, such as bilateral regulations (not domestic regulations). However 22 
 
variation of this type will also include the PTA dummies, so removing this also would not 
allow us to estimate the variables of interest. However regulations that are specifically 
directed at one trading partner are not expected to be very common.   
A further bias that can occur is a measurement bias of the variables of interest. This received 
some mention in BB2007. PTAs need not necessarily be strongly correlated with the 
underlying policy barriers that they are trying to measure. There are many examples for this; a 
well documented one has been the case of MERCOSUR
21. The formal signing of a trade 
agreement will not automatically implement all of its directives and so decrease the trade 
costs they intend to decrease. Rather the signing of a preferential trade agreement is merely a 
formal commitment to doing so. Although there are legal constraints on non-compliance these 
are as is often the case in international issues difficult to implement. This is made even worse 
if none of contracting nations’ governments show a will to do so. Governments and other 
agents can often find ways to surpass the directives of PTAs, and use health or environment 
standards to “boycott” certain imports. The date of entry-into-force of the trade agreement as 
notified by the WTO will not always mean that all of these barriers will disappear in that year. 
They may never disappear at all or it could be that regulations and tariffs have been adjusted 
beforehand, and the notification of the agreement is merely a formality. Head and Mayer 
(2000) find that border barriers within the European Union gradually decreased from 1976-
1995, rather than in 1986 alone when the Single Market Directive was introduced.
22 In the 
ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) community the signing of an FTA 
(AFTA) occurred much later than the establishment of the community. Since the stated aims 
of ASEAN also included economic cooperation, it is likely that some barriers to trade were 
already removed prior to the official creation of the Asian Free Trade Area, AFTA. These are 
forms of measurement error that could bias the estimates of the PTA dummies. In the latter 
                                                            
21 Preusse (2001). 
22 Head and Mayer (2000). 23 
 
case the effect of the PTA would be underestimated, since what it is aiming to measure has 
already occurred.  
Another aspect is the time allowed for agreements to phase-in. PTAs entail a vast set of legal 
documents and provisions that in some countries can take long to put into practice. Some 
agreements therefore include phase-in periods in which countries are given a deadline by 
which the directives must be adopted.  This is often the case when developing countries are 
involved since they might lack strong institution to do so.  
Also, the knowledge of an upcoming PTA might make firms change their behavior in light of 
the new regulations before they are already in place. The measurement bias could therefore be 
upward or downward. Here the date of entry-into-force will be used as given by the WTO for 
the lack of a better alternative and as is common in the literature.  
In some cases however, for example AFTA, the date of entry-into-force is set as 1992. 
Scrutinizing other sources
23 found that the actual date set was 1993, rather than 1992, and that 
Vietnam, and Laos Peoples Democratic Republic only entered much later, in 1995, and 1998 
respectively (a third country Myanmar also accessed later, but is not in the sample). Using the 
1992 date therefore led to some very strong negative effects of AFTA, which were somewhat 
reduced when the proper dates were used. As a check for such measurement bias we will run 
a separate set of regression including dummies for each of the large regional blocs in the data. 
The various single agreements will not be considered. Looking at the specific dummies can 
give hints towards measurement bias. Such measurement bias has an effect on the average 
treatment of the type of agreement they are a part of, it will be informative to check whether 
there are reasons to believe that this is the case. 
                                                            
23 http://www.aseansec.org/ Internet presence of the ASEAN Community 24 
 
4.3 Data 
The trade data is taken from the Trade and Production database from the French Center for 
International Economics (CEPII) website
24. It is largely based on the World Bank dataset by 
the same name. The flows were aggregated into total trade in manufactured goods, according 
to ISO Revision 2 standards. Gravity model variables such as distance, language and 
contiguity are also taken from CEPII. The GDP and population figures are taken from the 
World Bank Development Indicators, available on the website.
25 Both trade flows and GDP 
are nominal and in current $US.  
There is a choice between using nominal or real GDP and trade flow data. This involves 
normalizing the data by the CPI of local countries (found for example in the Penn World 
Tables). Authors such as Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) have found no significant differences 
in their estimates using nominal and real data. Here we will use nominal data for both trade 
flows and GDP. 
The data will also be subject to inflation or deflation of the local currencies. This is time-
varying, so that there will be a bias in the estimates if it is not controlled for. Inflation occurs 
has been shown to have global trends, so this will affect all trade figures and cause spurious 
correlation in the data. According to Rose (2000) and Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) this is 
easily controlled for with the inclusion of time dummies that capture time-variation that affect 
all countries and trading pairs.  
The panel consists of 50 countries (as listed in the Appendix) based on data availability. This 
unfortunately means that the former communist countries of Eastern Europe were left out, 
since many countries were lacking data prior to 1990. Many Eastern European countries are 
currently undergoing or have completed integration processes with the old EU countries (EU-





liberalization enjoyed new found fame (it was the time of the Uruguay round, and 
considerable trade liberalization in Latin America, East Asia, and Europe where the Single 
Market Directive was signed). There is a total of exactly 49,000 observations. All countries 
are grouped into trading pairs (except of course if importer=exporter), giving 2450 pairs in 
total. There are only 4726 observations with zero trade flows, amounting to about 10% of the 
sample.  
4.4 Model Specifications 
Traditional estimations of the gravity model have been done using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) on a cross-section of countries. Following the relevant literature presented earlier these 
results are assumed to be heavily biased since there are strong indications that in cross-
sections we have strong endogeneity of PTAs. We will follow Baier and Bergstrand (2007) 
and make use of the panel data we have at hand. We will use pooled OLS on the entire sample 
to provide some first-off estimates. Pooled OLS simply uses normal OLS techniques while 
pooling all the data together. In this way it does not differentiate between the individual 
trading pairs.  This means that if there are individual specific effects that are unobservable 
pooled OLS will be biased.
26 There is reason to believe that the natural trading partner 
hypothesis (the determinants of which are likely to be time-constant), the restrictiveness of 
regulations between countries, and other determinants of PTAs and trade that are mostly 
cross-sectional in nature will enter into the error term making the results biased and 
inconsistent. We do not expect very plausible coefficients from these preliminary regressions. 
In order to address the endogeneity problem which is caused by time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity, we use fixed effects regressions. Fixed effects are commonly preferred to 
random effects.
27 This is confirmed in the sample used here using the Hausman test. Fixed 
                                                            
26 Baltagi Chapter 1. 
27 Martinez-Zarzoso et al (2009) for example. 26 
 
effects will also control for the time-invariant part of Baldwin and Taglioni’s (2006) “gold-
medal” error.                                                        
Following Baldwin and Taglioni 2006, there are several remedies for multilateral resistance 
when using panel data. They are pair and time dummies, nation and time dummies, and time-
varying nation dummies. The estimated model using pair and time dummies is given by: 
 
                                                                                                          
(15) 
 
Time dummies will control for all year specific effects that affect all countries and trading 
pairs. This includes de/inflationary effects of the currencies. In addition, the nation and time 
dummies on the other hand leave bilateral specific time-constant unobserved heterogeneity 
uncontrolled for. The most appropriate control for the MTRs according to Baldwin and 
Taglioni 2006 would be to use also time-varying nation dummies, i.e. interaction terms of 
nation and year. This completely controls for the MTRs. However, this does not allow for the 
estimation of any nation and year specific effects such as GDP or Population, since they 
themselves are country specific and time-varying. The estimated model using these country 
and time interaction effects can be written as such: 
ln                              
       
                                      (16) 
 
The major drawback is the large set of dummies that it incorporates. In total there are 
(2NT=2*50*20=) 2000 dummies. Since the sample contains a large amount of observations 
(2N(N-1)T), there are (2*50*49 *20=) 98000 degrees of freedom, which will easily suffice.  
Until recently this would have provided us with the most unbiased results achievable, 
suggested by the literature. The final bias that will be considered here is that of omitting the 
extensive margin. 27 
 
4.4.1 The Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein 2-Step Model 
The HMR2008 model consists of a two-step estimation. First a selection equation is 
estimated, which allows predictions of the probability of positive trade flows between country 
  and country   given the set of observables. The motivation is that the variables which 
determine the volume of trade are largely the same as those that determine the probability of 
trade between any two countries. The model suggests that country specific effects (such as the 
cost characteristics) should be included since there are fixed effects of importers and exporters 
also. They will at least capture the time invariant aspects of the cost characteristics. Since the 
estimation here is an expansion of HMR2008 to panel data, the inclusion of time dummies is 
also warranted. The vector of PTA dummies is also included.  
Following Heckman (1979) and Wooldridge (2002)
28, there must be an exclusion restriction 
in such two step estimation methods. This is some variable that is related to the determination 
of a trade relationship but not to the amount to countries trade. Otherwise the system will be 
completely identified. We will use common language since we do not believe that the use of a 
common language will determine how much countries trade once a trade relationship is 
established. HMR2008 also use language as the exclusion restriction, as well as Martínez-
Zarzoso et al (2009).  
The selection equation will be estimated by a random effects probit method. Random effect 
method uses more information in that it also uses variation between the different pairs rather 
than only within the pairs. The variation of dependent variable, whether or not there are 
positive trade flows between the two countries, is not expected to vary much per trading pair.  
The system is specified as such: 
 
                                                                                        
                             
            
                                                                       (17) 
                                                            
28 Chapter 10.  28 
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The fixed costs of trade     , from the theoretical model will be captured by the importer and 
exporter fixed effects    
      
  , and the pair specific fixed effects such as the log of distance, 
language and contiguity (             ). These are expected to influence the fixed costs of 
trade and the variable costs of trade. The GDPs and populations of the countries will also 
enter into the selection equation, in the same way as in the previous specifications.      is 
equal to unity if there are trade flows between country   and  . As in other sample selection 
models á la Heckman there is a problem of correlation between the error terms of the 
selection equation and the second-step gravity equation.      is an unobserved variable that is 
positive when there are positive trade flows, it is related to      . According to Helpman et al 
(2008), before adding      into the final equation it should be divided by the standard 
deviation from the selection equation to obtain     . This will give a consistent estimation of 
the proportion of firms trading.  The selection effect is corrected for by the inverse Mills ratio: 
    
   
      
   
Φ     
                                                                    (19) 
 The firm-level heterogeneity is also subsumed in the     , since the probability of trade is an 
increasing function of the productivities of firms in a country, following Pavcniv (2001) and 
the model specification by Melitz (2003) and also Helpman et al (2008).  
The second step gravity equation will be estimated once with nation fixed effects and time 
dummies, and once with nation and time interacted dummies.  
 
                                                                                         
                       
                                                        (20) 
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Full consideration of the MTRs is given by:  
 
                  
       
                              
                              (21) 
 
What is new compared to previous panel data regressions is the inclusion of the extensive 
margin     .     
   is the Inverse Mills Ratio proposed by Heckman (1979). 
5. Main Results 
We will move along the different model specifications using a stepwise approach, gradually 
improving the specification. The results are listed in Table 3. 
Using pooled OLS we find that the trade agreements customs union, deep FTA and common 
market have statistically significant and negative effects. FTAs are insignificant in predicting 
trade flows. This is obviously not what is expected. The reasons are likely to be the presence 
of endogeneity bias, and omitted variable bias of not considering the extensive margin. The 
inclusion of time dummies does not have a large effect, although the negative effects are 
reduced somewhat. The coefficients on standard gravity model variables like distance and 
contiguity are as expected. The log of distance reduces trade by about -1 (similar to what we 
found in the cross-section analysis). The GDP coefficients are also around unity which is 
suggested by the theoretical literature and what has been found by priors. Employing fixed 
effects and time dummies move the coefficients closer to 0. The customs union and deep FTA 
effect is now not statistically different from zero, hinting that these types of agreement are 
probably subject to some downward endogeneity bias, which has kept their effect below what 
it should be
29. Completely taking care of gold-medal error of ignoring multilateral trade 
resistance induces some strong change in the coefficients. Whilst now the time-constant 
endogeneity bias and the endogeneity bias given by domestic regulations are controlled for we 
                                                            
29 This was also found to be the case in Magee (2003) and BB2007. 30 
 
see that the customs union and deep FTA have statistically significant positive effects on 
trade. These are economically large. We expect the deep FTA as well as the customs union to 
be particularly affected by the domestic regulation effect because of the deeper integration 
achieved. The common market is unaffected by the inclusion of MTRs, and its effect on trade 
is pushed downward again. FTAs remain insignificant.  
We can see that introducing the extensive margin affects all coefficients upward. Leading to 
believe that there is some correlation with the amount of firms that trade and the existence of 
a PTA. Interestingly the effect on trade flows is pushed upward. All but the common market 
(which is insignificant) have a strong effect on trade now. The FTA coefficient shows the 
smallest effect on trade, which is consistent with the hypothesis that deeper agreement cause 
more trade than the more shallow agreements. The extensive margin itself enters positively 
and significant, although its economic effect is quite small. It is similar to the effect found in 
the original paper by Helpman et al (2008). There is a strong selection bias effect, which is 
surprising since there are not many zero trade flows in the sample.  
In our preferred and final model that combines the complete inclusion of the MTRs as well as 
the extensive margin we find that common markets suddenly have stronger positive and 
statistically significant effect on trade volumes. All other types of agreements enter 
significantly and positively. The strongest effect, being that of a customs union, is expected to 
more than double trade compared to the reference group. Apart from that we see stronger 
effects of the deeper agreements than of the FTA, which only has a small economic effect. 
The Common Market effect is similar to that of the FTA, which is surprising. Post 1992 only 
Austria, Finland and Sweden join the common market. The EU-effect which can be seen in 
Appendix C, is on the other hand quite small. One reason for the Common Market effect to be 
so small could be that trade amongst these mainland European countries could have been 
largely saturated already. The extensive margin remains more or less the same in its effect.  31 
 
The results confirm that the endogeneity bias and the Helpman omitted variable bias are 
strongest for the deeper agreements. The multilateral trade resistance correction affects all 
types of agreements in a similar way. 
The results for the individual trading blocs are given in Appendix C. We can see that AFTA 
has had a strong negative effect on the bilateral trade flows within the bloc. This might pull 
down the FTA coefficients reported above. This could be due to the measurement error 
mentioned earlier.  
The average treatment effect of PTAs is a 57% increase in trade  0.57      .       1    
100 , is close to the average treatment effect found by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) in their 
sample covering 60 years and 96 countries in Table 5 of their published paper. It is much 
larger than the effect found in Helpman et al 2008, leading to believe that endogeneity bias 
has provided for underestimated coefficients in their estimations using cross-sectional data. 
Our results are also comparable to Magee (2008) who found and average impact of an RTA 
on intra-bloc trade of 42%, although he did not considered the inclusion of the extensive 
margin and focused instead on the anticipatory effects of RTAs on trade.  
In general we expect there to be trade creation effects within the regional bloc. The export and 
import effects with the RoW are not easily predicted. In general the rise in trade within the 
bloc should decrease trade outside the bloc. 
Table 2. Gravity-panel data estimates 
 
This effect can be reduced through increases in income which raise trade levels in general. 
The imports from the RoW by member countries are however more likely to decrease than the 
exports. Consumer within the bloc will now have goods available for lower prices from within 
the bloc. 
The signs for import and export effects of PTAs change under the different model 
specifications. Looking only at results of our preferred model, the Helpman et al model with 32 
 
interaction terms, we see that the fears of PTAs causing trade diversion effects are not 
confirmed. All but exporter effects of common markets and exporter and importer effects of 
deep FTAs show significant and positive signs, which is clear indication of trade creation 
effects. Although this is an indication that deeper trade agreements tend to show less trade 
creation effects than the more shallow agreements. The other three are insignificantly 
different from zero. In the specification including interaction terms, but not including the 
extensive margin we have negative import and export effects, but also negative intra-bloc 
effects. Surprising are the import and export effects for standard FTAs. Whereas the intra-bloc 
coefficient is significant yet economically small, and in some specifications even 
insignificant, the export effects are strongly significant and economically large and positive. 
The same counts for the import effects. We attribute this to measurement bias of the AFTA 
agreement, and the fact that the FTA dummies consist mostly of agreements signed between 
single countries, where the scope for substitution from extra-bloc trade to intra-bloc trade is 
not as large as in agreements that include many countries.  
6. Conclusion 
Previous results which showed that preferential trade agreements have positive effects on 
bilateral trade flows have been confirmed using our sample. Further by disseminating between 
the different types of agreements, we have found that the deeper agreements, customs unions, 
“deep” free trade agreements, and common markets have stronger effects on bilateral trade. 
This highlights the role of domestic regulations in international trade flows, and shows that 
economic integration on a regional basis provides a good platform to harmonize such policies. 
We have also confirmed that deeper integration agreements are especially affected by two 
latter biases, namely the extensive margin of trade and the endogeneity bias.  
According to our results, the trade diversion effects on extra-bloc trade are lower than 
expected. The fears that regional blocs will create strong regional preference and harm third 33 
 
countries are therefore not entirely justified, although there is still some trade diversion for the 
deeper agreements. 
Given the proliferation of regionalism in the last decades, the study of preferential trade 
agreements and their effect on trade flows is bound to gain even more importance in aiding 
the decisions of policy makers, especially in light of the recent advances made in providing 
more reliable results. 
As a suggestion for future research on this topic we propose the estimation of our final and 
preferred model using dynamic panel data techniques (preferably a dynamic two-step 
selection model). Also disaggregate trade data could be informative since the structure of 
trade is likely to differ greatly between country pairs. The structure of trade between countries 
is also likely to affect their decision to enter preferential trade agreements, as well as their 
effect on trade flows. Some studies have been undertaken using data disaggregated on a level 
of firms, this is a field which could yield interesting results regarding the extensive margin of 
trade and the role of preferential trade agreements. 34 
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Table 1. Classification of Regional Integration Agreements  
Type of 
Agreement 










FTA Yes     
Deep Free Trade 
Agreement 
FTAd Yes   Yes   
Customs Union  CU Yes    Yes 
Common Market  CM Yes  Yes  Yes 




Table 2. Gravity-panel data estimates 
  OLS  OLS time  FE time  FE it jt  Helpman time  Helpman  it 
jt 
lnYe  1.363*** 1.380*** 0.176***   0.240***   
  166.077  167.643  7.612    10.207   
lnYi  0.992*** 1.011*** 0.646***   0.657***   
  126.513  128.366  28.352    28.856   
lnPe  -0.164*** -0.173*** 3.004***    2.383***   
  -18.298  -19.366  30.933    22.979   
lnPi  -0.090*** -0.094*** 1.286***    1.080***   
  -10.598  -11.043  13.732    11.409   
CM  -0.637*** -0.355*** -0.317*** -0.028  -0.129**  0.156* 
  -9.827  -5.265  -7.473  -0.464  -2.819  2.503 
CMe  -0.497*** -0.396*** -0.118*** -0.316*** -0.025  -0.535*** 
  -12.538  -9.784  -4.367  -3.909  -0.896  -6.907 
CMi  -0.505*** -0.327*** -0.296*** -0.125  -0.194***  0.177* 
  -13.644  -7.891  -10.301  -1.544  -6.607  2.189 
CU  -0.275*** -0.353*** -0.084  0.720***  0.237***  1.010*** 
  -4.605  -5.882  -1.56  4.341  3.822  6.034 
CUe  0.207*** 0.173*** -0.324***  0.724*** -0.308***  0.694*** 
  5.845  4.833  -10.488  4.045  -9.968  3.887 
CUi  0.351*** 0.234*** 0.249*** 0.06  0.202***  -0.085 
  10.716  6.343  8.469  0.924  6.82  -1.287 
FTAd  -0.626***  -0.518***  0.009 0.441 -0.009  0.515* 
  -5.16  -4.257  0.115  1.867  -0.108  2.184 
FTAde  -0.318*** -0.187*** -0.062*  0.337  -0.074**  0.315 
  -8.016  -4.596  -2.212  1.363  -2.622  1.275 
FTAdi  -0.145*** 0.001  0.059*  -0.039  0.015  -0.081 
  -3.62  0.023  2.017  -0.159  0.513  -0.332 
FTA  0.09  0.068 0.049 0.058 0.110*  0.146* 
  1.885  1.419  1.02  0.976  2.277  2.423 
FTAe  0.214*** 0.230*** 0.449*** 0.993*** 0.453***  0.924*** 
  9.021  9.652  20.306  15.961  20.537  14.668 
FTAi  -0.195*** -0.009  0.053  0.894***  0.02  0.694*** 
  -8.351  -0.245  1.862  10.708  0.691  8.533 
contig  0.379***  0.403***       
  7.597  8.125         
comlang  1.025***  1.052***       
  35.245  36.232         
colony  0.175***  0.119*       
  3.571  2.448         
lnD  -1.029***  -1.015***       
  -85.294  -84.269         
zhat      0.049***  0.071*** 
          9.788  12.213 
Inverse mills      -0.492***  0.092 
          -8.387  1.365 
cons  -19.757*** -20.267*** -75.787*** 8.637***  -63.689***  8.402*** 
  -106.762  -106.416  -31.322  -209.475  25.287  168.77 
R2_a  0.726 0.729 0.385 0.499 0.389  0.501 
N  44277  44277  44277  44277  44277  44277 
ll  -87624.04 -87419.19 -60329.95 -54777.73 -60182.07  -54707.26 
rmse  1.7516  1.7436  0.9726  0.8776  0.9696  0.876 
Note: Y denotes GDP at current US$ and P denotes population. Ln preceding the name of a variable indicates that natural 
logs have been taken. CU denotes Customs Union, CM denotes Common Market, FTA denotes Free Trade Agreement, FTA 
denotes Free Trade Agreement, FTAd denotes Deep Free Trade Agreement, e and i denote exporter and importer, 
respectively. Contiguity is a dummy that takes the value of one when the trading countries share a border. Comlang_off is a 
dummy that takes the value of one when the trading countries share official language. D denotes physical distance between 
trading countries and Colony is a dummy that takes the value of one when a pair of countries has ever had a colonial 





List of Countries     
Argentina  El Salvador  Japan Portugal 
Australia Finland  Korea,  Rep.  Singapore 
Austria  France  Kuwait  Spain 
Bolivia Germany  Lao  PDR  Sweden 
Brazil  Greece  Malaysia  Switzerland 
Brunei Darussalam  Hong Kong, China  Mexico  Thailand 
Canada  Hungary  Morocco  Tunisia 
Chile Iceland  Netherlands  United Arab Emirates 
Colombia  Indonesia  New Zealand  United Kingdom 
Costa Rica  Ireland  Norway  United States 
Denmark  Israel  Peru  Uruguay 
Ecuador Italy  Philippines  
 
APPENDIX B 
Agreements and accessions signed between 1980 and 2000: 
-EC Treaty of Rome 1957, Customs Union and Common Market in 1992 
Members prior to 1980: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom  
Accessions: 
1981: Greece 
  1986:  Spain  and  Portugal 
    1995: Austria, Finland, Sweden 
-EFTA: Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland 
-EEA, EIA between EFTA (excluding Switzerland) & EU members. Considered as a deep 
FTA, since there is a common market, yet no common external tariff  
-MERCOSUR 1994: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
-CER with EIA: Australia and New Zealand. Had previously been a FTA.  
-AFTA: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam 






Table B.1 Grouped according to type of agreement and including the agreements between 
single countries or single countries and regional blocs. 
 
Common Market  Customs Union  Deep FTA  FTA 
EC, post 1992  MERCOSUR (1994)  NAFTA (1994)  EFTA (1960) 
  EC-Turkey (1996)  CER (1995)  AFTA (1993) 
   Costa Rica & Mexico 
(1995) 
US & Israel (1985) 
   Canada & Israel (1997)  EC & Sitzerland 
(1972) 
   Canada & Chile (1997)  EC & Iceland (1972) 
   Mexico & Nicaragua 
(1998) 
EC & Norway (1972) 
   Chile & Mexico (1999)  EFTA & Turkey 
(1992) 
   EEA (1994)  EFTA & Isreal (1992) 
     Turkey & Israel (1997) 
     EC & Tunisia (1999) 
     EFTA & Morocco 
(1999) 
Source: World Trade Organization RTA gateway, and internet presences of individual agreements. 40 
 
APPENDIX C 
Table C.1  Panel Data Estimations for single Regional Blocs 
  OLS  OLS time  FE time  FE it jt  Helpman 
time 
Helpman     
it jt 
lnYe  1.389*** 1.440*** 0.161***   0.228***  
  168.264  173.171  6.803    9.541   
lnYi  1.002*** 1.055*** 0.592***   0.619***  
  122.174  127.481  25.606    26.716   
lnPe  -0.189*** -0.229*** 2.962***    2.302***   
  -20.137  -24.489  30.663    22.005   
lnPi  -0.109*** -0.150*** 1.263***    1.016***   
  -11.77  -16.234  13.35    10.61   
EU  -0.662***  -0.595***  0.241*** 0.313*** 0.417*** 0.586*** 
  -11.117  -10.085  3.783  5.273  6.236  9.245 
EUe  0.315*** 0.195*** -0.028  -1.000***  0.014  -0.700** 
  11.021  6.767  -0.768  -4.121  0.388  -2.965 
EUi  0.238*** 0.118*** 0.038  1.242*** 0.04  0.808*** 
  8.326  4.084  1.045  5.205  1.088  3.482 
EFTA  1.524***  1.525***      
  9.233  9.345         
EFTAe  -0.091*  -0.186***      
  -2.275  -4.686         
EFTAi  -0.421***  -0.512***      
  -10.533  -12.917         
EEA  0.683***  0.374***  0.055 0.081 0.079 0.188*** 
  8.469  4.58  1.053  1.679  1.475  3.791 
EEAe  -0.505*** -0.082  -0.032  0.749*  0.073*  0.374 
  -12.71  -1.774  -1.048  2.556  2.333  1.279 
EEAi  -0.681*** -0.259*** -0.152*** 0.322  -0.037  0.296 
  -17.15  -5.647  -4.97  1.106  -1.18  1.017 
MERC  0.505 0.382 -0.135  -0.2  0.411 0.585** 
  1.519  1.163  -0.63  -1.018  1.861  2.865 
MERCe  -0.262*** 0.042  -0.388*** -0.414  -0.331*** -0.009 
  -3.834  0.608  -8.444  -1.62  -7.178  -0.036 
MERCi  -0.415***  -0.113  0.598*** 2.484*** 0.573*** 1.850*** 
  -6.042  -1.612  12.747  9.558  12.252  7.558 
CER  0.843**  0.756* -0.193 -0.225 0.532  0.830* 
  2.77  2.514  -0.44  -0.563  1.204  2.042 
CERe  0.362***  0.398***  0.048 0.049 0.066 0.291 
  7.792  8.629  0.744  0.21  1.032  1.279 
CERi  0.019 0.069 0.107 1.091***  0.064 0.792** 
  0.41  1.468  1.569  4.263  0.945  3.166 
AFTA  0.111  -0.062  -0.641*** -0.769*** -0.597*** -0.676*** 
  0.929  -0.525  -7.959  -10.381  -7.411  -9.113 
AFTAe  1.094*** 1.463*** 0.890*** 1.125*** 0.907*** 1.277*** 
  25.93  32.899  28.337  4.734  28.955  5.503 
AFTAi  0.329*** 0.689*** 0.298*** 2.397*** 0.327*** 1.884*** 
  7.738  15.442  9.443  8.313  10.308  6.637 
NAFTA  0.527  0.413  0.447* 0.374* 0.808***  0.916*** 
  1.745  1.382  2.226  2.034  3.963  4.881 
NAFTAe  -0.828*** -0.596*** 0.005  1.390***  0.120**  1.483*** 
  -12.93  -9.168  0.119  5.56  2.721  6.08 
NAFTAi  -0.365*** -0.137*  0.130**  3.061***  0.196***  2.488*** 
  -5.722  -2.106  2.988  12.11  4.51  10.047 
contig  0.399***  0.386***      
  7.997  7.809         
comlang  1.044***  1.088***      
  35.966  37.86         41 
 
colony  0.117*  0.051      
  2.43  1.075         
lnD  -1.038***  -1.040***      
  -86.611  -87.628         
zhat      0.045***  0.070*** 
          8.91  13.057 
Inverse 
mills 
    -0.535***  -0.124 
          -9.127  -1.88 
Constant  -19.777*** -19.942*** -73.392*** 9.140***  -60.336*** 8.873*** 
  -104.758  -104.832  -29.965  179.658  -23.48  153.22 
R
2_a  0.7338476 0.7400529 0.3924139 0.4928667 0.3962182 0.4954643 
N  44277  44277  44277  44277  44277  44277 
ll  -87011.68 -86479.91 -60023.14 -55033.29 -59883.03 -54919.05 
rmse  1.727313  1.707058  0.9658551  0.8824074  0.9628267  0.8801447 
Note: Y denotes GDP at current US$ and P denotes population. Ln preceding the name of a variable indicates that natural 
logs have been taken. PTA dummies correspond to the abbreviations given in Appendix B, e and i denote exporter and 
importer, respectively. Contiguity is a dummy that takes the value of one when the trading countries share a border. 
Comlang_off is a dummy that takes the value of one when the trading countries share official language. D denotes physical 
distance between trading countries and Colony is a dummy that takes the value of one when a pair of countries has ever had a 
colonial relationship. Zhat is a proxy for the extensive margin of trade. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-values reported 
below each coefficient. 
 
 
 
 